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An Abstract

Argentina in 1976 was a place of unusual paradox.
The government with more than 60% of the popular vote seemed
to have crumbled to the ground with almost no backing from
those who had put it into office.

Its downfall was due to

its inability to resolve the "national crisis" facing the
nation.
On 24 March 1976, the military finally intervened
via a coup d'etat.

Under the new regime, violations of human

rights have been reported and protests have been made by leading human rights movements.

The military junta argues that

its policies and course of actions are necessary for the restoration of civic and economic order and the elimination of
an internal threat from communism.
What plunged Argentina into a state of chaos was
violence, which has mounted progressively since the late-50s
as groups with widely different political objectives and conceptions struggle for power.

The utilization of violence

410002

spread like a contagious disease from which no one remains
immune.

Tragically being touched are the lives of a growing

number of defenseless victims who are either kidnapped, disappear, or even coldly murdered.

Indiscriminate and unres-

tricted acts of violence have turned every place one can imagine into a battlefield in which there is no known refuge.
Few countries in the world have experienced a deterioration of human rights conditions comparable to that felt
in Argentina in recent years.

This study attempts to present

the inevitable contradiction between a government deploying
tactics of repression to resolve the very political and economic problems repression aggravates.

Naturally, it is accep-

tableto most people that a government must maintain public
order and preserve the safety of its subjects.

Further, it is

also acceptable that in the life of any nation, threats to the
public order or to the personal safety of its inhabitants, by
persons or groups that use violence, can reach such proportions
that it becomes necessary, temporarily, to suspend the privilege of certain human rights.

But to use terror as a form of

regular and normal government?
When a government enjoys a broad popular support,
which is the case of the Videla regime, it seems certain that
the method of confronting the threat of "left-wing terrorisn"
through legal means will always be successful.

The reestab-

lishment of civic and economic order can not possibly be
achieved by undertaking acts of establishment terroriso.
necessitates the search for alternative solutions.

This
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Y con los pobres de la tierra
quiero yo m1 suerte echar:
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me complace masque el mar.
From

Versos Sencillos
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AN OVERVIEW
Argentina in 1976 was a place of an unusual paradox
(see eg., Fernandez, 1976; Jordan, 1977; Rock, 1978; Smith,

1980).

The government with more than 60% of popular votes

seemed to have crumbled to the ground --with almost no support from those who have put it to office because of its inability to solve the crisis nacional (national crisis) facing
the nation (see eg., Fernandez, 1976; Jordan, 1977 and 1979),
Indeed, the government of Marfa Estela Mart!nez de Per6n faced
not only problems of political violence 1

but also the rapid

deterioration of the Argentine economy. 2

The military was

reluctant to intervene in the political processes despite
increasing urges of the masses to do so.

What was evident,

1. Violence is deep rooted. It became widespreaded
since 1969 and mounted progressively from the left to the
right as groups with different political objectives and conceptions struggled for power. Terrorism had also taken on
broad dimensions. Bombings, robberies, kidnappings, and
assassinations for political purposes were not uncommon. This
was what Isabel Peron inherited (see eg., Fernandez, 1976;
Rock, 1978).
2. In 1974, inflation rose to 40.1% (Jordan,
The increase was the result of the imposition of
wage and price controls which furthered the distortions in
the economy. In 1975, several attempts (the repeal of the
absentee clause oi' the labor law, the granting oi' permission
for state-owned companies to charge prices covering costs,
the encouragement for foreign investment, and the attempt to
curtail the budget deficit) were made to lower the rapid rise
in prices and to check the worsening of the balance of payment
(OAS, 1979: 2). These attempts, however, produced no result.

1977: 5).

1

2

however, was a strong sense of disunity between both the
government and the military.

3

On the one hand the govern-

ment feared that by asking the military to help it solve the
political crisis --the mounting violence that seemed interminable-- would, in fact, be inviting military rule again.
for its part, the military clearly did not want to help.

And

4

Many Argentines told me that they would rather be
under the military rule than under the peronist regime.

Month

after month, rumors were spreaded about military plots to take
over.

But nothing of that nature occurred.

On the night of

23 March 1976, however, news that troops from Magdalena had
moved into the capital lifted away all doubts.

5

The military

had decided to step in.

3. It was when I arrived at the Ezeiza Airport,
located on the outskirt of Buenos Aires, that I learned that
only three days earlier certain Sector of the military had
been conspiring to overthrow the government.
In effect, on
18 December 1975, the disaffected sectors of the Air Force
rose up in a rebellion against the government of Mrs. Peron.
They disavowed the authority of the national government and
called upon Lt. Gen. Videla to assume command of the republic
in the name of the armed forces. Videla, however, declined
.the offer and intervened instead against the rebels. The
symptom was temporarily cured on 22 December. Fernandez noted
this as the concept of institucionalidad or the preservation
of the institutions (1976: 73),
4. As one high ranking official said unofficially,
"Why should we risk our necks so that the peronist can stay in
office and ruin the country?"
5, I recalled my father waking me up on the morning
of 24 March 1976 and told me of the coup. We turned on the
radio and tuned it on radio nacional.
It was playing the
soundtrack from the movie The Sting --an appropriate tune,
we laughed.
It was today and everyone seemed to have expected
it.

3

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Under the regime of Lieutenant General Jorge Rafael
Videla violations of human rights in Argentina have been
reported and protests have been made by such bodies as
Amnesty International, the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights, the Argentine Commission for Human Rights, the Perma~
nent Assembly for Human Rights, and other major human rights

. t·ions. 6
organiza

Moreover, it is said that "few countries

in the world have experienced a deterioration in human rights
conditions comparable to that felt in Argentina in recent
years" (Department of State, 1980a: 17),

The ruling junta,

on the other hand, argued that "its policies and actions have
been necessary to restore civic and economic order and to
eliminate a serious threat to the country from domestic communism" (Department of State, 1980a: 17),
This study is, therefore, an attempt to present
insights to the political conflicts in present day Argentina.
The author will attempt to encompass the followings into the
scope of the study:

6. Among them: National Council of Churches, the
US Catholic Conference, the World Council of Churches, the
B'nai Brith Anti-Defamation League, the AFL-CIO, the Executive Committee of International Labor Organization, the
Council for Hemisphere Affairs, and the International Commission of Jurists.

4

a) the politics of repression leads to instability
b) two terrorist groups employ the use of the politics of repression as means to achieve their objectives
c) these two terrorist groups can be classified as
the establishment terrorists (the government) and the
revolutionary terrorists
d) the contradiction is inevitable with respect to
the employment of the politics of repression on the part
of the establishment terrorists since instability and
decline economic growth are the results of such tactic
--to. bringforth the restoration of civic and economic
order would necessarily mean the seeking of alternative
routes.

DEFINITIONS
Human Rights
There are two fundamental frameworks of human rights:
the integrity of the person and the civil and political liberties of the individuals.

The former includes freedom from:

torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
the denial of fair public trial; and the invasion of the home
(see eg., Department of State, December 1979).

The latter

includes freedom of: speech, religion, and assembly; movement
within the country, foreign travel and emigration; and the

5
participation in the political processes.
When these two fundamental frameworks are denied:
when thousands of people are in preventive detention without
charges or trials and thousands more remained unaccounted for;
when there is no indication that the ruling regime will return
the country to constitutional rule or that it will relax the
emergency legislation introduced to suppress its citizen,
despite popular call for a return to a democratic government
and the restoration of the rule of the law --as it is alleged
to be the case of Argentina-- it is the purpose of this study
to seek understanding of what had happened that led to the
denial and abuse of these rights.

Terrorism
Political and ideological violence, which sometimes
arises from and contributes to such conflict, includes what
is commonly known as terrorism.

According to the Brockhaus

Encyclopaedia, terrorism is the form of the political struggle for power in order to induce a state to commit reciprocal
acts, to shake the confidence in the existing system, and to
intimidate the majority of the population (Middendorf, 1979:

89),

Karanovic defines terrorism as ''systematic and organized

violence against nonresisting persons to create fear in them
for the purpose of using that authority for exploitation or
opposition or to extract political concession" (1979: 81).

6

In the Argentine context, we may classified te~rorism into two categories: the revolutionary terrorists who
engage in action of resisting an oppressive totalitarian
regime; and the establishment terrorists who employ such tactic for the purpose of protecting and preventing harmful elements from the society. 7

Political Repression
Political repression is almost impossible to define.
The word "repression" connotes the acts of constraining.

We

seek here, in this study, to find out how political activities
are constrained and by what means are these acts of constrain
exercised.
For the purpose of our analysis we can perhaps sum
up categorically the concept of political repression in the
context of the Argentine scenario as followed:
a) it is an organized system utilized by both the
establishment and the revolutionary terrorists
b) it is an old tradition inherited by various
groups along the political spectrum to achieve specific
goals

7. It must be taken into account that one man's
freedom fighter is another man's terrorists as one man's
tyrannical regime is another's benevolent regime.

7

c) this organized system is aimed at psychological
results
d) the purpose of this aim is to create an emotional
state of extreme fear in specific groups and thereby to
ultimately change their behavior and dispositions, or to
bring about a general or particular change in the structure of society
e) there is an exhibition of force which will transform the society ~-this exhibition of force is to demonstrate the authority for exploitation or oppression or
to extract political concession
f) there is effort to systematically eliminate political opposition which obstructs the path to the control
of power
g) the result is the psychological feeling of terror,
helplessness, and depression among the masses so that they
refrain from opposition, resistance, or demonstration.

DELIMITATION OF
THE STUDY
This study is an analysis of the political conflict
in Argentina, 1976-79,

It is the intention of the author to

demonstrate through descriptive means and observations that
the use of the politics of repression bringsforth instability.
In doing this study, the author will try to provide his readers

8

with background information in the areas of politics and,the
economy preceeding the Videla regime which are relevant in
understanding present day Argentina.
There are, without any doubt, topics that the author
will not be able to provide adequate treatment of.

Peronism,

for instance, deserves a separate study by itself,

The author

tries to keep the scope of his study narrow for the purpose
of manageability.
The topic of political repression is indeed sensitive in nature.

Therefore, in attempting to evaluate and

to interpret this study, the author would like his readers to
be aware of a number of serious problems including factors
other than human rights which may have important consequences
on the political situation in Argentina.

Also the readers

should bear in mind the study's delimitations when considering
any plausible conclusions that might be drawn from it.

RELATED LITERATURE
There exists a wide range of information on the
topics of both human rights and terrorism.

Nevertheless,

materials which deal, in substance, specifically with both
topics in the Argentine setting are indeed scarced.

Hence,

the author focuses upon subject matters which have direct
impact on the topic in question.

The sources, for the use

in this study, may be classified into the following cate-

9

gories:
a) human rights documents - under this headings are
included many items such as Amnesty International reports,
Comite de defense de droits de l'homme, Human Rights
reports prepared by the US Department of State, Congressional Hearings on Human Rights practices, for instance
b) social science documents - there are many history,
political, economics, and social documents which are
relevant to this study.

Sources for these documents

include newspaper articles, editorials, books, periodicals,
and essaies.

PROCEDURES
Primary and Secondary Documents
This study is conducted through an examination and
analysis of both available primary and secondary sources.
Primary documents were gathered during the time the author was
enrolled in the Universidad Cat6lica Argentina in Buenos Aires
from March 1976 to July 1978.

This experience proved extremely

helpful to him in evaluating and assessing materials employed
in the study.

It also allowed him to comprehend the complexi-

ty of the situation in Argentina.
Documents from Amnesty International and Comite de
defense des droits de l'homme were gathered during the author's
, .

short seJour in New York and Paris.

Documents from the
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Argentine Embassy, which were given to the author while in
Paris, are also relevant to the study.

Documents from the

US Department of State and Congressional Hearings are also
considered to be primary source and they are used in this
study.
Secondary documents include French, Spanish, and
English books and periodicals related to the topic.

These

two sources have been compiled and analyzed in the hope of
shedding light to further the understanding of the political
conflict in Argentina.

Research Methods
Different research approaches are employed in this
study.
them.

The author would like to mention only briefly about
For readers who are interested in the topic, the

author suggests he read Julian Simon's "Research Methods"
(1978).

Research methods employed in the thesis consist
primarily of a descriptive analysis.
is used in the study of terrorism.

Classification analysis
Comparative analysis is

used in the author's attempt to draw explanations from chapters two and four of this study to give weight to his hypothesis.
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Organization of the study
Chapter two gives an account of the historical
background in the areas of politics and the economy of Argentina.

Chapter three accounts the ruling junta's economic

performance (1976-79),

Chapter four analyzes the type of

setting (milieu) the Videla regime inherited and presents
some idea on the scale to which the politics of repression is
employed in Argentina.

A conclusion is then drawn from the

synthesis of preceeding chapters.
Appendices are included preceeding the lists of
selected bibliography.

ARGENTINA TODAY
Today Argentina is modern and wealthy.

If one had

any doubt about this statement, one only has to consult surveys conducted on this country put out by such publications
as The Economist (26 Jan, 1980), L'expansion (18 juil./ 4
sept. 1980) --to name a few.
so?

After all, why should it not be

Argentina is the seventh biggest nation in the world and

it has only 26 million inhabitants to share its riches.
has a mild, pleasant climate.

It

Its heart, the humid pampas,

is rated as one of the five richest agricultural areas in the
world,

Argentina is the second most important oil-producing

nation in Latin America, after Venezuela.

It is one of the

world's largest grain producers; second largest beef exporter;
and fourth biggest wine producer.

It produces also a large

variety of manufactured goods and heavy machineries (the above
information is taken mainly from the Economist, 26 Jan. 1980:
7) .

In comparison with its neighbors, a large proportion of Argentines are middle-class.
lation are literate.

Nine tenths of the popu-

Four fifths of the people live in the

cities --a very high standard for Latin America (World Bank,
1980: 111 and 149),
Argentina is abundant in natural resources.
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It is

13

also self-sufficient in crude oil (The Economist, 26 Jan.
1980: 25).

With its new petroleum fields in the Gulf of

San Jorge, near the Patagonian port of Comodoro Rivadavia,.
where reserves of 240m barrels have been found, some 530,000
barrels of oil are being produced annually to satisfy up to
93% of its domestic demand (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 25),
The government projected that by 1985, the country will indeed
be self-sufficient.
The Argentine natural gas industry is the most
highly developed in Latin America (The Economist, 26 Jan.
1980: 25).

There are some J85b cubic meters of natural gas

recently discovered in a vast field in the south western province of Neuguen (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 25),

The

main gas field in use now are in the northern, western, and
southern provinces.

An extensive pipeline system links them

with the industrial centers.
The most important coal deposits are those of R10
Turb10, in the province of Santa Cruz.

There are 450m tons

of coal --although only a mere 1,500 tons are mined each year
(The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 26).
At the moment 6% of the country's electrical consumption comes from hydro-electrical plants (The Economist,
26 Jan. 1980: 26).

Argentina plans to have 73% of electrical

energy generate from this source by the end of the century.
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Also supplying the public with electricity are
nuclear power plants.

Two percent of public consumption come

from these sources (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 26).

Accord-

ing to the government, three more plants will be completed
by 1997.
There are 11,000 tons of natural uranium in the
country (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 26).

Other natural

resources such as copper, molybdenum, gold, lead, silver, zinc,
and barium can be found in large quantities (The Economist,
26 Jan, 1980: 26).

However, much of Argentina's mineral

wealth still remains to be explored and exploited.
Yet although Argentina is potentially richer than
either Canada or Australia, its position in the world in term
of per capita GNP have sunk from having the 15th highest to
the 26th (The Economist, 26 Jan, 1980: 4).

Many regarded

Argentina as "one of the world's great failures --a country
that though endowed with apparently limitless possibilities,
seems incapable of realizing its potential" (Falcoff
197 5: ix). 1
wrong?"

&

Dolkart,

Hence, one can not help but ask, "What went

In this chapter we will explore Argentina's past ..

1. An Argentine friend of mine offered an explanation as to why Argentina did not develop into one of the world's
great power. He told me that when God created the world, He
lavished so much natural wealth on Argentina. Naturally, other
nations started to complain to God about it. Hence, to redress
the balance, God sent Argentina the Perons. Indeed, to many
Argentines, the Per6ns were the cause of the malady they now
confront.

15

HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND
Throughout the late 19th century and until 1916,
Argentina was governed by a loose coalition of conservative
political elites representing commercial and landowning interests.

They formed no truly national political party but

joined together at elections to preserve control (see eg.,
Falcoff & Dolkart, 1975),

In 1916 ~lections the conservative

monopoly was broken by the Union C1vica Radical (UCR - Radical Civic Union). 2
and middle class.
d'etat in 1930.

The UCR was composed mainly of moderates
The party prevailed until a military coup

Following this period, Argentina was to

undergo several cycles of alternating civilian and military
rule.
There can be no doubt that in 1940 Argentina was
not the most advanced of the Latin American nations.

In

general industrial terms or in the terms of every major specific industry Mexico and Brasil were far ahead (see eg., Rock,
1975; Villanueva, 1975; Alsogaray, 1980).

During the early

war era, the conservative Argentine landed aristocracy, still

2, The UCR is the second most important political
force in Argentina after the peronist movement.
Its leader,
Ricardo Balbin, was a presidential candidate in 1952, 1958
and twice in 1973, He was never successful, but, at the age
of 76, his democratic views have given him considerable prestige.
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in control of the Argentine government, had stiffled serious
study of mineral deposits for fear that the discovery of coal
and iron in quantity would make heavy industry inevitable and
hence end the political predominance of the Argentine landowning class.

For fundamentally the same reason, the land-

owning government was not too enthusiastic in putting the
wartime Pinedo Plan for planned industrialization for fear
that it would result in a lessened dependence on agricultural
and foreign trade (see Green, 1971 and especially Rock, 1975:

lBJ-89).
The Rise antj. Fall of "El L1der", 1940-1955
The military revolt of June 194J that overthrew
the old conservative party signaled the beginning of a shift
in political power toward the industrial bourgeoisie and the
industrial and urban working classes.

It was at this time

that Argentina saw the intergration of the nation's poor
and laboring people, los descamisados (the shirtless ones),
as active political participants and the emergence of organized
trade union as a key political

force. J

Argentina, a leading

J. Hodges wrote: "(A)ccording to the standard academic interpretations of peronist support from organized labor, that support derived mainly from a politically naive
stratum of industrial workers consisting primarily of rural
immigrants to the new industrial working centers of Cordoba,
Rosario and the capital city of Buenos Aires. This new working
class was upwardly mobile, unable to identify with the long
traditions of struggle of a disciplined and independent working

17

democracy of Latin America at the time, subsequently succumbed
to "an upsurge of messianic populism that would forever alter
the rules of the political game" (Falcoff and Dolkart, 1975:

35).
Throughout 1944 continued among the various socioeconomic factions and within the ruling military junta itself
a jockeying for positions.

By the end of 1944, however, the

shrewd and opportunistic Colonel Juan Domingo Per6n Sosas had
emerged as the leading figure both in the junta itself and in
the national competition for political control. By using the
power of his offices, 4
Peron was able to build a personal
followings upon a new and powerful coalition of military and
working class support (footnote J offers some insight to this
idea).

The phenomenon of peronism posed the most serious chal-

lenge yet to the predominance of the old pre-revolutionary
governing elites.

J. (cont'd.) class, untouched by Marxist and socialist ideas and, correspondingly, an easy prey of nationalist
dema,¥;_og~ and massive manipulation by organized political elites
.. ,Lbu_:y recent studies show that the principal support for
peronism did not come from the new working class of unskilled
and semi-skilled workers from the interiors. On the contrary,
the principal support for peronism also derived from the
highly politicized sectors of the old working class ... In Studies on the Origins of Peronism, Miguel Murmis and Juan Carlos
Portantiero further show that the internal division within the
Argentine working class is less significant in accounting for
peronist support than the unity of organized labor both old and
new 11 (19761 10).
4. Peron was the Vice-President of the Republic.
He also held the cabinet portfolios of both War and Labor.

18

By mid-1945, the land-based groups were fighting
for the survival of their political support and influence.
The industrial middle class and the prolos (working class),
particularly organized labor were rapidly gaining political
power.

Juan Peron was to find some of his strongest supporters

and most useful allies among them.
President of the Republic.

In 1946, Peron became

By .this time, the peronist move-

ment had consolidated its majority, increasing it to nearly

65% in the election of 1951,

Peron's political strategy and

tactics were authoritarian and personalistic.

During his ad-

ministration a state of internal war was declared enabling him
the expansion of the executive power.
In the field of economics, Peron's policies were
successful up to 1949 largely because of the prosperity of
exports during the pre- and post-war era.

Soon after, it

became increasingly difficult to finance imports of vital raw
materials because of inflation and worsened terms of trade.
Peron was forced to take a more conservative stand in matters
such as credit providing to the rural areas, interest rates,
and wage-price controls.
After the death of his second wife, Evita, it was
apparant that Peron could not cope with mounting pressures
from economic deterioration, labor unrest, and lost of political support in all sector of the country.
his two-term in office could not save him.

Consequently,
He was ousted by
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a military coup led by Gen. Eduardo Lonardi and was sent into
exile (Hodges,

1976: 7-24).

It is argued that Argentina's economic progress has
been retarded owing much to distortions stemming from the
Per5n era

(1946-55) and its aftermath (see esp. Thompson, 1978:

229),

Era of Political Merry-Go-Round,

1955-1973

After two months in office, Eduardo Lonardi gave
way to Gen. Pedro Eugenfo Ararnburu.
dent in November 1955,
anti-peronist stand.

The latter became presi-

The new ruling junta took a fiercely
It dissolved Peron's party and placed

the Confederaci6n General de+ Trab~jo (CGT -General Labor
Confederation), an organized union which was the strong supporter of Peron, under state administration (Whitaker,
1-JO).

1975:

But the peronists were able to infiltrate the new

political structure.

In the election of

1957, one fourths

of the voters heeded their call to cast blank ballots.

The

peronists wielded con~iderable influence on the factions that
were competing for power.
Frondizi for President.

In

1958, they supported Arturo

It was alleged that Frondizi had

promised to readmit the peronists to political activity in
return for their supports.

Indeed, Frondizi won the presidency.

But control of important districts, among them the
province of Grande Buenos Aires, was in the hands of the
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peronists.

Not long after, the military withdrew its support

from Frondizi.

It moved in to dissolve the parliament and

set up a government in the name of Jose Marfa Guido, president
pro tempore of the Senate.

Guido's 18 month administration

saw the polarization of the military: los colorados (the red)
and los azules (the blue).

The red sought a dictatorship

that would deal strongly with the peronists and the extreme
leftists.

The blue, on the other hand, favored a new consti-

tutional government by coalition including the peronists.
However, the blue wanted to see the peronists confined to a
relatively weaker role.
The election of July
victory for Arturo Illfa.

1963 resulted in an unexpected

Once in office, Illfa tried to

split the resurgent peronists, who were now in control of the
labor unions, from their exiled leader, Juan Peron.
his waterloo when in June

He met

1966 the peronists supported a

coup that brought to power Gen. Juan Carlos Onganfa.
The Onganfa regime declared that it was to rule for
an indefinite period.
peronists.

It was an abvious back-fire for the

Ongania further declared that the responsibility

for change was to be carried out by the military --if necessary by force without the need to seek popular support.

With

the stated objective in m1nd, the Ongania regime moved into
war against major institutions which had played an important
role in politics: political parties were abolished; universi-
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ties were "cleansed" of their left-wing and centrist elements.
The regime ruled by firm hand. 5
Disturbances arid riots were frequent.

The rebellion

in Cordoba or the so-called el Cordobazo, rose out of student
and labor alliance against the government's economic policy
and its "general improverishment of groups outside the oligarchic bourgeoisie; the medium and small bourgeoisie, the middle
sectors, sections of the working class displaced by the growth
of monopoly capital" (Rock, 1975: 212),

Underground activities

were orchestrated by a Trotskyite group, the Ejercito Revolucionar10 del Pueblo (ERP - People's Revolutionary Army) and
by peronist groups --among them the Movimiento Peron{sta Montoneros (MPM - Montoneros peronist Movement).

In 1970, the

MPM captured and assassinated former president Aramburu who
was organizing a movement for a return to constitutional rule.

6

This, it is said 7, was the cause for a coup d'etat against
the Onganfa regime in June 1970.

Gen. Roberto Marcelo Leving-

ston became new Argentine president until he was ousted by

5, In suppressing conventional political activities,
let us note, the Ongan1a regime had weakened considerably the
institutional capability to moderate and channel conflict.
6. The MPM declared that his assassination was a
reprisal for the massacres he had ordered as head of the government in 1956. However, his close associate, Hector Sandler,
said in an interview that Ongan.5'.a was in fact responsible for
Aramburu's death (see Latin America Regional Report, 7 March

1980: 6) .
7, This view is expressed by various writers cited
in this paper.
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Gen. Alejandro Lanusse a year later.
The Lanusse regime was the third military regime
since 1966.

It announced immedia~ely for the restoration of

representative democracy and set scheduled for presidential
elections which was to be held in March 1973.

The regime also

called upon various political parties to join it in its attempts
to save the nation from revolutionary anarchy.

Lanusse was

counting on the peronists to join him in this project of
reviving the traditional structures in the hope of using them
as a buffer between the regime and the forces of popular unrest.

The Return of "El L1der"
After 1971, the peronist movement regained much of
its middle class support from the small entrepreneur groups in
the Confederaci6n General de la Economfa (CGE - General Economic Confederation) and other associations (Rock, 1975: 217).
Students and other lower middle class groups had evolved into
a new left-wing

,

of the movement --the Juventud Peronista

(JP - Peronist Youth).

From this point onward, the battle for

popular support, which a priori were fought between the students and the radical unions, now became transposed into an
internal struggle within the party itself: between the JP;
old middle class remnants of peronism; and the CGT bureaucracy
(see eg., Rock, 1975 and Hodges, 1976).

The CGT had at this
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time opted for a moderate line while the JP, essentially
middle class, attempted to commit the party to a socialist
position with strong emphasis on nationalism and antiimperialism (see among others, Rock, 1975; Hodges, 1976).
In the meantime, Lanusse launched the Grande
Acuerdo Nacional (Great National Agreement) 8

--a program

aimed at bringing peronism into the political scenario as a
means to prop up conservative order (Rock, 1975: 217),

He

hoped to regenerate Argentina's capitalist structure by promoting political consensus rather than through military dictatorship (Rock, 1975: 217),

The ERP answered back by issuing

a statement that "the figure of Peron constitutes at present
the last means of escape for the Argentine bourgeoisie, and
in this sense it is counter-revolutionary" (Rock, 1975: 217),
In fact, Pertn himself was also bidding for power.

He main-

tained formal alliance with the non-peronist movement in the
hope of using them to form a strong foundation for his political power.
candidature. 9

The military, however, barred Peron presidential
It accepted, instead, Peron's pliant protege,

8. The Great National Agreement was a plan launched
by Lanusse in 1971 in which he urged for the establishment of a
single coalition all sectors of the population --both those
which had and had not participated in the political processes
since the outlawing of Per6n s party in 1955, This front was
to include the traditional right, the representatives of business both large and small, sectors of the labor bureaucracy
and the military.
1
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Dr. Hector J, Campora who later became president in May 197J,
Under C~pora's administration the left-wing peronists were
able to consolidate its grip on the JP and gained considerable
influence.

It was Per6n 1 s return to Argentina in June that

year that occassioned the "Ezeiza Massacre" where more a thousand peo~le died

--fighting for what they believed to be the

true peronist way (Gente, 1979), l-0

,

The nationalist Montoneros, being disillusioned

with Peron, had by May 197J now become a quasi-Castroist outfit
and joined with local Marxist group (see Hodges, 1976: esp,
chps. 2

&

J).

Violence mounted progressively from the left

9, Hodges explained, "Per6n was unacceptable as a
candidate to the military government. Anticipating that any
popular front with Per6n on its ticket would carry the elections scheduled for March 1973, Lanusse announced on July 9,
1972 the adoption of a residential clause prohibiting any person from running for public office who had not established
his residence in Argentina prior to August 25, 1972, Per6n
was unable to comply with this new restriction. He could not
return safely until Lanusse chose to annul the charge against
him as a 'traitor' pending before military tribunal since 1955,
nor could he return legally without proper documents and the
government's authorization" (1976: 59).
10. While in exiled, Per6n made use of his followers.
There were, in fact, two factions in the movement: the left
and the right. The former, consisted of urban guerilla known
as the MPM, Peron called them his "special formation" (Timerman, 1981: 44). While on the right saw the emergence of a
mysterious "AAA" or the Alianza Ant1comunrsta Ar entina (Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance . Not to be confused with the
Argentine Automobile Association, the "AAA" was an organization
vowed to "cleanse" the party of Marxist elements. It was
headed by Jos~ L6pez Rega, Peron's confidence. He financed
the "AAA" with fund from his Ministry of Social Welfare (Fernandez, 1976: 76). Obviously, the break was inevitable.
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to the right of the political spectrum as they struggled for
power under different political objectives and conceptions.
Both the right-wing and the left-wing of peronism were engaged
in acts of terrorism which had taken on broad dimensions:
bombings, robberies, kidnappings, and assassinations for political purposes were not uncommon occurrences.

As the situation

deteriorated further, Peron withdrew his support from C~mpora.
The latter resigned on lJ July

1973, 11

It was at this time that the conservatives and the
right-wingers came to the conclusion that only Peron had the
political ability and strength to bar the way forward to the
extremist groups. 12

Hence, they supported him in the up-

coming election in which Peron ran on a ticket that included
his third wife, Mar.1a Estela Martfne z -- better knovm as "Isa~

belita"-- as vice-president.
tory for the Perons.

The election resulted in a vic-

They took office in October 1973,

Peron continued his campaign ar~ainst the left, the
Marxist guerilla groups, and other extremist groups with renewed intensity.

Many of his followers denounced him and

11.
C~mpora was not able to resist pressures from
the peronist political and trade union leaderships (Hodges,

1976: 78-9),
12. The ERP issued a statement warning that, "if
peronism accepts the political game imposed from outside and
tailored according to the needs of the dominant neo-bourgeoisie it will weakened forever its capacity to become the principal instrument of the National Revolution" (Rock, 1975:
218).
.
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passed into opposition.
But the seventy-eight years old Peron could not
stopped the violence.

According to Senor Marcelo Lugones,

an Argentine publisher, whom I interviewed, Per6n never had
the intention of stopping the violence.
assault on the country he so hated."

"It was Peron's last

13

Less than a year later, Peron died of a heart
attack.

His wife and constitutional successor, Isabel1ta

became the new president while the situation deteriorated further especially in terms of the economy and violence.

13, Marcelo Lugones is a friend of the Lanusse family.
His comment is based upon his reflections of the peronist years.

THE ECONOIVJY
Traditionally, Argentines enjoyed relatively equal
distribution of income (Department of State, 1981: JJ4).

In

recent years, however, it has been less equal as a result, in
part, of the Videla administration's policies designed to reduce inflation and to revitalize the country's productive
sector.

Inflation
Spiralling inflation has been the central economic
problem confronting Argentina throughout the 60s, the ?Os, and
into the 80s.

It is said that inflation was the result of the

increase in government spendings during the Per6n years. 1

1.
The Argentine peso "which stood at 5 to the
dollar in 1955, underwent series of devaluations until in 1970
its parity was 400 to the dollar. The cost of living in Buenos Aires rose from a base of 100 in 194J to 680 in 1955.
Later estimates using 1960 as the base year placed the level
at nearly 700 in 1970 (with corresponding index number of J
for 194J and 20 for 1955), This means that 700 pesos had
approximately the same purchasing power in 1970 that J pesos
had in 194J" (THD in Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 1979: 1140).

Also must be taken into account is the fact that
the peronist government was largely depended on organized labor,
hence, it was unable and unwilling to resist union wage demands
(Jordan, 1977: 57),
The rate of inflation in 1975 rose to
JJ4.B% (Jordan, 1977: 57). The state's deficit was 408% above
that of 1974 (Jordan, 1977: 57), A massive devaluation program was attempted.
This attempt and other subsequent programs
to correct "the strong imbalances in relative prices .. ,.[and
27
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The decline in real wages has had serious effect on
the standard of living of the majority of the Argentines.

In

1976, the consumption of food dropped by 40% and purchases of
clothing by 50% reflecting the JOO% rise in the price of clothing (Department of State, 1980a: 26). 2

Official estimate

is that there has been a 60% decline in the purchasing power
of wages (Department of State, 1980a: 26).
Inflation brought with it harsh social consequences.
Price incrases more rapidly than income can adjust to.

Econo-

mic efforts designed to control inflation have imposed severe
hardships on the poor who lived on a maladjusted social security benefits and the middle class with savings.
sector also suffered,

The private

Big companies are relying more upon

borrowings from abroad rather than confronting with the high
interest rates and risks on foreign exchange at home.

Pri-

vately owned companies are reluctant to borrow, to raise capi-

1, (cont'd.) to reduc..§7 the real income of those
labor sectors /y;ere met with failures which7 ... led to increase
disharmony in a continuously worsening situation" (OAS, 1979:
2). There was also the problem of unemployment --which was
largely disguised by massive increase in the bureaucracy (Jordan, 1977: 58). Argentina saw the populist formula regime
for economic catastrophe and disorder: inflation plus disguised unemployment undermining saving and capital formation,
debasing the currency through printing, and circulating more
money than justified by tax revenues --hence, destroying the
country's financial system and its financial reserves.
2, In 1980, the monthly rate of inflation dropped
sharply during the final quarter of the year. It expanded at
the rate of 8J% compared with a rate 174% during the first 8
months of 1979, These figures reflect the consumer price
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tal, or to launch new ventures.

Directly hit are small ~nd

medium sized companies which are often trapped between rising
opportunity costs and a fickle market (see The Economist, 26
Jan. 1980: 22).
When the private sector fails to invest, the government feels ogligated to do so.

The Videla administration's

share of the GNP in 1980 was 37% (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980:
22),

In 1979, the government announced that it had reduced

public employment by 100,000 but the state still continues to
account for about
Jan, 1980: 22),

50%

of total investment (The Economist, 26

The results, hence, are of two-fold: first,

it adds to the state deficit; second, it keeps inflation
surging ahead,

The vicious circle becomes nearly impossible

to break,
In 1976, after the coup d'6tat, Videla and his
government seeked the imposition of wage controls,
ing was cut by a third (Smith, 1980: 85),
fallen

Real earn-

Real wages have

rapidly due to the fact that the cost of living index

to which wages are tied to does not reflect the full impact
of price increases on a working class family.

Since wages

are indexed to the cost of living only every three months, it

2,
(cont'd,) index. The wholesale price showed
astonishing stability, with an annual rate of increase of less
t~an 50% durin~ the last quarter (Latin America Regional Review, 1980a: 1),

JO

seems obvious that living standard would decline during the
waiting period.
Although the government has now freed wages in the
private sector, wages are supposed to rise only if there is
an increase in productivity (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 22).
In the public sector, however, wages are still under control.
~

According to Dr. Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, the Minister of
Economy, the distortion in the national economy of the 1970s
was the results of three main causes:
... the inefficiency of an industrial sector
protected by excessive tariffs; the persistence of
demagogic policies that kept wages artificially high;
and discrimination against the rural sector, notwithstanding Argentina's comparative advantage in the J
production of cereals and meat (Smith, 1980: 65).

INTERNATIONAL TRADE
High tariffs and import-substitution were the cornerstone of Argentina's post-war efforts at industrialization
under Gen. Juan Domingo Per6n.
discourage.

Foreign investment was largely

In effect, Per6n set up one of the world's least

efficient industrial bases behind tariff wall,

He had also

J. In his correspondance to me, Dr. Peter H. Smith,
the Head of the Dept. of Humanities at Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, commented, "(T)he statement ... refers not to
objective reality about wage prices, but to perceptions of the
Martinez de Hoz team --with specific reference to wage prices
during the Peron regime. (t)he Martfnez de Hoz group apparantly sees this as a necessary corrective for the 'demagogic'

Jl
pioneered the xenophobic feelings in the Argentines: the
anti-British and anti-American nationalism.

The result had

been a climate of instability in which neither foreigners nor
Argentines themselves would invest to put the country's easy
going industries on the go, or would they even attempt to
unlatch the country's vault of untapped agricultural, energy,
and mineral resources. 4

,

When Alfredo Martinez de Hoz took office as the
Minister of Economy in March 1976, he announced that tariffs
would be dismantled and foreign investment would be encouraged.
Many admit now that it did not seem possible at the time, but
Martinez de Hoz had proven that it could be done --even when
taking into account special interests that must be accommodated and Argentina's inefficient industries: steel, chemicals,
automobiles, electronics which were reluctant to permit foreign
competition.

,

But Martinez de Hoz did succeed in carrying out

his program for free trade (see eg., Smith, 1980; The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980).
Recently, Argentina was able to enjoy balance of

J. (cont'd.) policies in previous periods, e~ecially the era of Per~n. They also believed that the CamporaPeron administration prompted a return to pro-labor policies."
4.
In 1939, the British owned 2/J of foreign
assets in the country. Foreign investment had greatly been
upset by Peron's programs. This could be said to be one of
the causes of the retardation of the Argentine economy
(see eg., Randall, 1978).
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payments surplus.

Thanks to its beef export, a deficit of

US$ 1,3b in 1975 was transformed into a surplus of US$ 650m
in 1976, US$ 1,3b in 1977 and US$ 2b in 1978 (The Economist,
26 Jan. 1980: 20).

Beef, the mainstay of Argentina's pros-

perity, had been ignored under the peronist administration
(1973-76).

Price control imposed by the peronist administra-

tion gave the farmers and ranchers only half the money they
could have otherwise fetch on world markets.

By freeing the

control, the government had, in effect, increased production
to 16.5m head of cattle as opposed to lOm in 1973 (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 20).
Since 1976i exports of goods have increased significantly.

In its economic review of Argentina, the Organization

of the American States (1979b) points out that by 1978 exports
of goods were more than double their 1975 value in nominal
terms (p, 17),

In particular, the response of the agricultu-

ral sector to new incentives and policies was especially positive, added to which favorable weather conditions allowed record harvests of several crops, resulting in 32.2 and 44.3
percents increased in sales abroad in 1976 and 1977 respectively (OAS, 1979b: 17), 5

5. Among the first actions taken by the new economic authorities in 1976 was to negotiate a stand-by credit of
US$ 300m with the IMF and, subsequently, to obtain financial
support of almost US$ lb from a group of private banks in the
US, Canada, Western Europe, and Japan. These actions made it

JJ

The government has also been encouraging foreign
investment.

A decree was passed in March 1977 allowing

foreign investors the remittance of all their profits home.
However, there is a small tax on capital remittance of more
than 12% (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 20).

Big investments,

nonetheless, will be needed in the country.

Thus far, the

gap has yet to be filled --one of the biggest deterrents to
investments is inflation.
In comparison to other sectors of the economy, the
foreign sector has experienced the greatest and most rapid
recovery from crisis it faced in 1975 and early 1976.

Posi-

tive results have been accomplished in the balance of payments
as a whole, especially in exports, capital inflows, and the
level of net international reserves. 6

ASSESSWiliNTS
Today Argentina enjoys a high standard of living.

5.
(cont'd,) possible for the government to meet
short-term external commitments by renegotiating a part of this
debt and converting it into obligations maturing in four years
or more (OAS, 1979b: 18). The guidelines issued by the economic
authorities on the foreign sector have been aimed at promoting
exports, decontrolling imports and attracting long-term official and private capital.
In this respect, since April 1976,
the measures adopted have tended to reduce taxes on major
policy that would take into account changes in purchasing
power between Argentina and its major trading partners (OAS,
1979b: 18).
6.
In l975, mainly due to the drop of nearly US$ lb
in exports of goods, the nation' net international reserves

J4

In 1979, per capita income in current dollars was an estimated
US$ J,400 (Department of State, 1981: JJJ).

The Argentine

government have, within the economic constraints of recent
years, sought to confront social needs (Department of State,
1981: JJJ).

Of total central government spendings in 1979,

10.1% went to education, J% to public health, and 4,5% to
housing (Department of State, 1981: JJJ).
for the period of 1970-79 was
of State, 1981: JJJ).
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Infant mortality

per 1,000 births (Department

Life expectancy is 69.4 years (Depart-

ment of State, 1981: JJJ).

There is one physician for every

5JO persons; a hospital bed for every 170 (Department of State,
1981: JJJ).

In 1978, 94% of the adult population was literate

(Department of State, 1981: JJ4).

To date, attempts have been

made by the government to keep up with swelling ranks of growing unemployed.

Official unemployment in Argentina was 2% in

1980, "although some observers believe that there is some
hidden unemployment" (Department of State, 1981: JJ4) (see
also footnote 1),
No doubt, the economy is in a period of reduced
growth.

Inflation is running about 90% for 1980 (Department

of State, 1981: JJ4).

Nevertheless, it is declining.

The

government's objectives are to maintain full employment and

6.

(cont'd.) declined by US$ 791m (OAS, 1979b: 17),

J6
monthly price changes have been somewhat erratic on many
occassions, the inflationary process has presented formidable
challenge to the anti-inflationary measures adopted by the
government. 7
Monetary and credit policy was one of the leading
instruments in combating inflation.

By gradually eliminating

the Central Bank's financing of the fiscal deficit, the economic team attempted to curtail the growth of the money supply
in excess of private sector demand in order to curb existing
inflationary pressures.

On the supply-side, the policy stressed

the close-monitoring of factors that tended to expand the supply of money and credit (see OAS, 1979b).

To meet the objec-

7. A review of the major macroeconomic variables
for the period 1974-78 reveals that no single real or monetary
variable shows a consistent correlation with the inflation
rate throughout the period (OAS, 1979b: JJ). In the first
two years of the period, the determinants of the inflation
seem to have been the major increases in public spending financed more and more heavily by the Central Bank in money
issue and the expansion of the money supply (OAS, 1979b: JJ).
This coupled with a steep growth in nominal salaries caused
a short-run spurt in domestic putput, as producers sought to
satisfy growing demand (OAS, 1979b: JJ). Shortly afterwards,
inflation accelerated sharply and consequently there was short
supply and growing unsatisfied demand (OAS, 1979b: JJ).
The significant drop in the rate of domestic inflation
during the second-half of the 1976 was achieved by measures
adopted by the economic authorities. These measures were aimed
at bringing down fiscal deficit, improving the public finance
situation in the balance of payments. The actions lowered
the high expectations of inflation and the stron~ drop in real
wages relieved the pressure on aggregate demand (OAS, 1979b:

22-35),
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tive, a more liberal interest rate policy was adopted to,
encourage the public to hold on to financial assets (OAS,
1979b: 33),

Supposedly, the higher interest rates would re-

sult in higher yields on financial assets and thereby allowed
the elimination of credit subsidies and contribute to a significant growth in total savings rate (OAS, 1979b: 34).

But

higher interest rates attract foreign speculative credit and
capital which have expansionary effects on the moneJ supply
(The Economi~t, 25 October 1980 and OAS, 1979b: J4).

Contra-

ry to government's expectations, this made domestic business
credit more expensive since the national financial system was
still able to pass on to its users any charge in its marketing
or profit levels (OAS, 1979b: J4).
Briefly, the most significant events in the monetary
and credit areas since 1976 were: the reform of the financial
system in mid-1977; the establishment of the currency regulation account; significant changes in the factors behind the
money supply; and, rise in both private credit and interest
rates (OAS, 1979b: 27),

Argentine's monetarist Cassandra,

Alvaro Alsogaray pinned inflation down as being nurtured,
"exclusively by the creation of money supply at a rate which
has no relationship with the goods produced or with the public's
desire to hang on to it" (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 19),

:

"-

THE FALL OF ISABELITA
By 1969 political violence in Argentina had given
rise to terrorism on broad dimensions with organized terrorist groups on the left and the right of the political spectrum numbering somewhere in the neighborhood of five to six
thousand persons, with an additional fifteen thousand sympathizers (Department of State, 1980: 241).

Consequently, both

civilian and military governments have maintained an estado
de emergencia (state-of-siege) for nine of the past ten years. 1
By 1975 the government of Isabel Peron had gone
through ten cabinet changes and four aborted economic plans 2
under four different ministers of economics (see eg., Fernandez, 1976; Jordan, 1977),

The end to the galloping inflation,

however, was nowhere in sight.

Mounting labor tensions coupled

with problem of financial corruptions within the government
put tremendous pressures on the peronist government.

1. Since 1955 there have been six military and
six civilian presidents.
2,
Among them: Ber Gelbard' act of national compromise, Gomez Morales' monetarism, the shock treatement recommended by the IMF applied by Clestfno Rodr.:i'.'go, and the modified monetarism and revived social pact of Antonio Caf{ero.
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The basic underlying conditions of the fall of
Isabel Peron were to be found: first, in the political crisis
and division within the peronists; and, second, in the peronist mismanagment of the economy which became evident in the
runaway inflation and negative growth rate during the 1975s
(see eg., Fernandez, 1976; Jordan, 1977; Hodges, 1976).

The

economic crisis compounded with political crisis resulted in
Isabel Per6n's inability to rule effectively.

In effect, she

confronted not only a weak and unstable government, a rapidly
decaying economy, but also an escalation of political violence.
Indeed, the peronist government was blamed for a deteriorating
political situation that was providing sustenance not only
to the guerillas but also to a generalized climate of mass
subversion.
The military certainly did not want the situation to
deteriorate any further.

But the question was how to inter-

vene successfully against a government which had received more
than sixty percent of popular votes representing the first
clear-cut majority in eighteen years of past interventions
that had ended in a blind alley for the military (Fernandez,
1976; Jordan, 1977),

Hence, it chose to intervene by quotas

and to wait for a political crisis to develop before making
a decisive move.

By the late-1975, Argentina was a country

of an unusual paradox.

The government that received an over-

whelming mandate from the people was rapidly losing all sup-
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port (Fernandez, 1976: 86).

It was the military' oppor~unity

to intervene.
The present Argentine military junta came into
power on 24 March 1976. 3

Lieutenant General Jorge Rafael

Videla became the tenth General-President imposed upon the
Argentines v!a a coup d'~tat. 4

Upon assuming power the

junta disposed of all democratic institutions. 5

But while

most political parties are banned, they continue to exist in
one form or another.

There have, however, been attempts to

establish dialogue between
political parties.

the military and leaders of these

Under the present condition, the following

groups seem to carry some weight in influencing governmental
decisions:
1) the Union Civica Radical (UCR) under Ricardo

3. Presently, Argentina is governed by a new junta
headed by Gen. Roberto Eduardo Viola.
4. The first in 1930 was Gen. Jose Felfx Uriburu.
In 1943, Arturo Rawson, Pedro Pablo Ramferez, and Edelmira
J, Farrel were put into power bI different military juntas.
Eduardo Lonardi and Pedro Eugenfo.Aramburu became presidents
consecutively in 1955, In 1966 Gen. Juan Carlos Onganfa,
Roberto Marcelo Levingston, Alejandro A. Lanusse assumed the
executive office. Videla is the tenth. In 1980, Gen. Viola
became the eleventh.
5, The National Congress, provincial legislatures
and municipal councils were dissolved. The power of all civilian authorities and elected officials were abrogated. All
political parties were suspended. All political activity was
declared illegal, The members of the Supreme Court and the
lower courts were removed and the judiaciary was replaced by
military tribunals. Trade union activity was outlawed. The
military, in effect, rules by decee.
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Balbin clamor for a return to democratic principles.
The UCR apparantly is hoping to pick up labor support
after the junta has finished with the peronists.
2) the conservatives and the developmentalists
seek power through relatively close collaboration with
the government.

3) the peronist opposition survive within the labor
movement, but it is divided.

There are two principal

labor organizations: the Comission Nacional de Trabais2.
(CNT - National Labor Commission), a conglomerate of
generally uncommitted and pragmatic unions that includes
the immmensely powerful metal workers union; and the
Veingte y Cinco (25), a coalition of five separate factions, three of which are peronists (Latin America Regional Reports, 23 May 1980: 7; Latin America Regional
Reports, 1 February 1980: 6; Smith, 1980: 63).
Attempts to unify the CNT and the
trade union movement have thus far met
(Smith, 1980: 63).

25

as a cohesive

without success

Moreover, the junta passed a decree on

labor organizations on 16 November 1979,

It was a measure

designed to ban all unions from political activity (Smith,

1980: 63).

This measure, in effect, undermined the institu-

tional strength of the unions for the law diluted their access to funds and took away their control of the social services.

Here is the paradox, the union themselves were show-
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ing signs of vitality and strength.

Further, in their

reaction to the junta, workers have frequently heeded to unions'
calls to take part in clandestine operations: slowdowns, stoppages, and sabotage (Smith, 1980: 63),

Hence, although the

unions have lost a great piece of their share of the pie,
they are still a major national force.
On the other hand, the ruling coalition is split
between two factions: los duros (the hardliners), who want
to extend the repression by means of an ideological war of
national purification; los blandos (the moderates), who advocate accommodation with political and social forces.

6

The

principal leaders of the hardliners are Gen. Carlos Suarez
Mason, army chief-of-staff, Gen. Iberico Saint Jean, governor
of Buenos Aires, and Gen. Luciano Benjamin Menedez, former
commander of the third army crops in Cordoba (see also Smith,
1980: 64; Latin America Regional Reports, 1 February 1980:
6; The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 11-12).
headed by Gen. Videla and Gen. Viola.

The moderates are
They are the people

in power now in Argentina.

TERRORISM
Terrorism is an old tradition in Latin America.

6. Some of these conditions, the readers will
notice, are quite similar to those mentioned in Chp. 2: 2023),

43

It was employed by political bandits and hired assassins.
It occurred during the wars of liberation as well as in civil
wars (see eg., Alexander, 1976).

For our purpose, we shall

categorize ''terrorism" into two groups: the establishment
terrorism (government); the revolutionary terrorism (urban
guerilla).
Many political researchers have agreed that terrorism on both sides of the political spectrum in Argentina
stemmed from a reformist-populist mass movement with which
many Argentines identified: peronism (see eg., Poutet, 1978;
Gabetta, 1979; Butler, 1976).

Although there are ideological

differences in these groups, most of them traced their origins

,

to Peron.
During the underground years, the special units
had gradually adopted the methods of their leftist comrades,
as well as their political convictions (see Butler, 1976).
The nationalist Montoneros, the followers of Per6n, later
became a quasi-Castro-Guevarist outfit and joined with the
local Marxist groups.

The deployment of the establishment

terrorism was started, with Pertn•s approval, by the Minister
of Welfare, Jost Lopez Rega, with the objective to "cleanse"
the peronist movement of Marxist elements. 7

7.
establishment
but that with
See also chp,

But Per6n had

This is not to say the deployment of the
terrorism did not·started before this period,
massive scale it was started duririg this time.
2.
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made use of both factions of terrorism.

The day of his return

to Argentina saw bloody battles among hostile factions of his
followers which resulted in hundreds of casualties in an episode of the "Ezeiza Massacre

11

(Gente, 1979),

It was after the resignation of Campora, many saw

,

Peron as the "saviour" who could end the unabated political
violence that nearly caused a civil war.
sident, Peron could not stop the violence.

When he became preHis harsh words

were to later antagonized much of his left-leaning fellowers.
They, in turn, vowed to overthrow his government (see also
chapter two).

Capitalist of Terror
Anywhere else in the world, terrorists would have to
work hard to make money.

This is not the case of Argentina's

Ejercito Revolucionar10 del Pueblo (ERP),

The ERP started out

robbing banks but later found a more lucrative method of earning money --kidnapping.

Or to put it more politely, the ERP

concentrated its effort on "expropriation" (Dobson and Payne,

1979: 90).
The kidnappings fulfilled three functions: first,
they brought in a great deal of money; second, they enabled
the ERP to maintain a correct radical approach; and third,
they pleased the xenophobic Argentines by attacking foreign
concerns and foreign officials (Dobson and Payne, 1979: 90).

,

.

Mario Santucho was the head of the ERP.

His group had claimed

"credit" for assassinating Abel R. Agarotti, the commander of
the national police; Oberdan Sallustro, the Argentine head of
Fiat; Gen. Juan Carlos Sanchez, and many other (see Dobson &
Payne, 1979 and the appendices at the er:i.d of this thesis).
Holder of a doctorate degree in Economics, Santucho, leader of
this Troskyite guerilla group, subscribed to the theories of
another Argentine, namely, Ernesto "Che" Guevara (Fernandez,
1976: 76).

Santucho was also inspired by the liberation of

the Vietnamese people (Fernandez, 1976: 76).

On 20 July 1976,

Santucho was killed in a scrimmage with security forces.

It

is now believed that the ERP has lost much of its fighting
capacity, particularly in Tucuman, although cases of kidnappings
and assassinations have been reported (Fernandez, 1976: 76).
The revolutionary cadres within the Juventud peronista (JP) in direct response to the Cordobazo gave rise to
the guerilla organization called "Montoneros". 8

The Monto-

neros are followers of a leftist-peronist philosophy.

For

Juan Pertn, they were his ;'special formation" (T imerman, 1981:

4J),

But the struggle between the Montoneros and the right-

wing faction of peronist movement prompted the former into
armed resistance against the very government it helped put
to power.

8. Montoneros were name of the gaucho contigents
of Argentina's first War of Independence in 1810 and of the
civil wars that followed (Hodges, 1976: 5J).
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The Montoneros too financed their activities through
"expropriation".

Supposedly, they also found a way to make

their money grow --they put the ransomed money that theJ had
collected into internation financial institutes through David
Graiver, and Argentine business tycoon (Dobson

&

Payne, 1979:

92). 9

Establishment ·Terrorism
Already before the coup led by Gen. Videla, the
deployment of the establishment terrorism had been in practice.
One of the most important groups in this category was the
11

AAA 11 which was given a carte blanche to carry out, with minimal

public attention or centralized coordination, the so-called
"dirty war" against subversion.

The practice continues.

Former Argentine Foreign Minister, Admiral Cesar Augusto Guzzetti, denied this --although his statement was itself a paradox:

There is no right wing subversion or terrorism
as such. The body of society is affected by a disease
that corrodes its entrails and forms anti-bodies.
These anti-bodies can not be regarded in the same wa:1
as the microbe itself. The action of the anti-body
will disappear as the government controls and destroys
the guerilla (House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1979:
135),

9, Graiver died in a plane crash. The government
is looking into the case of the conspiracy between the Montoneros and the Graiver Empire. But "in April 1978 Robert Morgenthau, the Manhattan District Attorney, declared that 'there
is a basis to believe L_'Graive!] is still alive" (Dobson &
Payne, 1979: 95), No one, however, knows where the moneJ is.
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Few weeks after the fall of Isabel Peron, Jacobo
Timerman, a·former editor and publisher of La Opinion, met
with several officers of the Argentine navy for lunch.
recalled the meeting (Timerman: 1981: 48-9),

He

It was discovered

forty-eight hours earlier that the food which was to be served
to certain high-ranking officers had been poisoned.

Hence,

the conversation centered around the question of what to do
with terrorism of the left.

Timerman was asked what he would

have done if the guilty party was arrested.

Timerman said that

he would have submitted the case to military tribunal and would
then invite journalists and foreign jurists to attend.

By

using legal methods to curb violence, Timerman reasoned, would
eliminate one of the major elements exploited by subversion
--the illegal nature of repression.
"But Timerman, don't you understand that
applying legal methods is equivalent to the death
sentence? 11
"I know. It's hard, but it's acceptable."
"So you'd be willing to accept the death
sentence for these people?"
"Yes, I'd accept it. I do accept it."
"Fine. Well, you can be happy --they've alreadJ
been executed ...
If we exterminate them all there will be fear
for several generations" (Timerman, 1981: 49).
Robert Harvey, a journalist of the Economist, offers
some insight on the situation in Argentina today:
... the use of official terrorism to counter ordinary
terrorism made Argentina a more dangerous place than
Chile after the coup because the rules of the game,
for the government's critic, were so ill-defined. A
journalist,. for example, might be given a wink by a
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minister t6 go ahead and publish an article critizing an aspect of government policy. But he would
not know whether a security service belonging to
the army, or the air force, or the navy, or local
military governor, or provincial governor, or independent of any of these, would or would not take
umbrage. And even a top minister might be unable
to help him if he was whisked off by a group of
unknown men one night (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980:
lJ).

Indeed from the Argentine government's point of
view, the problem of terrorism is highly complex.

Moreover,

as Harvey pointed out, the government may, in fact, unable
to control the killings and kidnappings by the securi t:r forces.

THE DIS APPEARED
My name is Oscar Alfredo Gonzalez. I was born
in La Plata ... I am married and have a six-year-old
son. I worked in the SIAP factory in the above city,
where I was an active member of the union, From the
time of the coup on 24 March 1976, I became more politically active.
In 1976 the army forced their wg:1 into my
parents' house on two occasions .{si.Q/· On 2 November
1977 I was kidnapped by a group from the Navy in
Buenos Aires, Federal Capital, I was tortured.
My new name was X-51,
On 6 December of the same year my wife, Estela
Maria Pereiro, was kidnapped and taken to the concentration camp Club Atl~tico. She had never taken
part in any political activities. In January 1978
Navy personnel told me that they were going to release her [si.Q7, I never heard any more from her.
I was kept prisoner for 15 months, first by the
Navy (TF J) and then by the First Army Corps (STF).
I soon realized that they were going to kill me and
I therefore started looking for·a chance to escape
(Amnesty International, 1980: 47). 10

10,

This is only one example reported to the AI.

Relatively new and broughtforth increasing concerned
by many are disappearances of persons resulting from officially
sanctioned political kidnappings.

The term itself has become

a euphemism for political murder, precede by intensive interrogation and torture of those who are not charged with any
specific crime.

Amnesty International explained:

Since the coup d'etat of March 1976 the most
horrifying aspect of the repression has been the
number of los desaparecidos --the disappeared. In
February 1979 the Buenos Aires Herald estimated that,
over the previous three years, there had been an
average of between J to 10 kidnappings a day. The
government denies all knowledge of the disappeared
or that they have been detained. Three times in
1978 the government published lists of people who,
it claimed, were thought to be missing but had
since been found (12 April- 232, 7 August- 201,
14 December- 159), No names on these lists corresponded with those known to Amnesty International

( 1980': 47).
There are also large numbers of persons held by the
disposal of the Foder Ejecutivo Nacional (PEN - National Executive Power), a decree signed by the president which does
not specify the nature of the crime which justifies imprisonment.

Most of the prisoners under this decree have been held

for two to three years, but there are some who have been in
preventive detention for more than four years. 11

According

11, Under the terms of article 2J of the Argentine
Constitution --Derecho de Opci6n (Right of Option) prisoners
held at the disposal of the PEN are entitled to leave the
country. However, very few applications have been granted
this right. The US State Department have also declared that
the government of Argentina has refused a large numbers of
option requests submitted by detainees to whom it has issued
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to the Review of Human Rights in Latin America, there are
approximately 1, JOO persons being held under this categor:1
(Department of State, 1980: J).
Amnesty International divides the disappeared into
four categories:
those released after a short time (from one to JO days)
--the largest category; those murdered; those who are
transferred to official prisons; those who remain
indefinitely fuera de la sociedad (outside society) 12
and whose place of detention is unknown (1980: 47),

TORTURE
, ,,to take a man by surprise, without allowing him any
reflex defense, even psychological fthat is the first
phase of tortur~. A man's hands are shackled behind
him, his eyes blindfolded. No one says a word ...
(Timerman, 1981: JJ)
The practice of torturing political prisoners first
became prominent under Gen. Ongan1a (1966-70), but it never
reached the, Uruguayan degree of cruelty and barbarism or
the Bolivian scope of the repression (Hodges, 1976: 2).
Nonetheless, mounting evidences pointed to the Argentine's
paramilitary security forces' deploJment of torture.

Amnesty

11,
(cont'~.) certificates of eligibility (Dept.
of State, 1980: J). See under Current Poli_sy_No~·_1-76.
12. Prior to March 1979, the Supreme Court had declared
that. the problem of the disappeared was outside its realm. It
was on J March 1979 that "the Supreme Court ... accepted for the
first time an appeal from a relative of a missing person, the
father of Alfredo Antonfo Giorgi, a JJ-year-old scientist who
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International, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Organization
of the American States documented many serious cases of violation of human rights in this respect.

Former detenees have

also reported that torture, practiced during the first days
of the interrogation, took the form of electric shock, immersion of the head in water, mock executions, severe beatings,
and psychological abuse.

Many individuals who disappear at

the hands of security forces are presumed dead (see eg., Timerman, 1981: 50-2).
We arrived at a certain place. A pair of large
doors opened up. They squeaked. Dogs barked close
by.
I was taken out of the car and flung onto the
ground.
A long interval elasped.
I could hear only
footsteps.
Suddenly, some bursts of laughter. Someone approached me and placed what seemed to be the
barrel of a revolver against my head. He put one hand
on my head and from up close he said, "I'm going to
count to ten. Say goodbye, Jacobo dear.
It's all
up to you."
I said nothing.
Again he spoke:
"Don't you want to say your praJers?"
I said nothing. He started to count. His voice
was well modulated --what you might call an educated
voice. He counted slowly, enunciating clearly.
It
was a pleasant voice.
I remained silent, wondering
was it inevitable for me to die like this? Yes, it
was inevitable. Was it what I desire1 Yes, it was
what I desire. Wife, children, I love you.
Adios,
adios, adios ...
" ... ten. Ha-ha-ha!"
I heard laughter.
I, too, bega13 1aughing.
Loudly. (Jacobo Timerman, 1981: 10)

12.
(cont'd.) on 27 November 1978 was taken from
the National Institute of Industrial Technology (1980: 47),
lJ. Timerman, later, acknowledged that the very
fact of his being alive was due to the help of Gens. Videla
and Viola who converted his disappearance into an arrest.
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Indeed government security forces had embarked
on a widespread counter-campaign of violence aimed at terrorists

as well as elements of the society which they consi-

dered "subversive".

Many known or suspected terrorists, as

well as persons with no subversive record, disappeared
(Comit~ de defense des droits de l'homme, 1978 documented
cases of the like).

Many others were detained without speci-

fic charge by the executive under the state-of-siege power
of the constitution.
The Permanent Assembly for Human Rights in Buenos
Aires carefully recorded and documented list of unexplained
disappearances contained about 6,500 cases for the period of
1976-79 (Dept. of State, 24 April 1980: 2),

Amnesty Interna-

tional estimated that at least 15,000 persons, or one out of
every 1,000 adults, have disappeared in the last two and a
half years (Amnesty International, 1979: 47).

There is also

substantial evidence that most of these people were abducted
by members of the military or the police forces.

The govern-

ment, however, denied any knowledge of the situation.

More-

over, the disappeared are not acknowledged as being under detention.

It is estimated that 6-8,000 disappeared persons

are being held at unofficial military camps (Amnesty International, 1980: preface).

They are not officially recognized

by the authority as political prisoners.

All writs of Habeas

Corpus, since the military took over, have been denied.

Those
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who are under detention are denied the right to see lawyers.
Conditions of detention were often cruel,

Serious

problems of mistreatment, torture, and insufficient medical
care often existed (Comitt de defense des droits de l'homme,

1978: 9).

According to the Comite, under the regime of Gen.

Videla the political persecution reaches an extreme violence.
Officially 2,JOO persons have been killed by the security forces
and the army between March and December 1976 (Comite de defense
des droits de l'homme, 1978: 10)
Critics of the Videla regime often cited the explicit admission by the government that it was indeed deploying
the use of establishment terrorism.

One of such admissions

was a remark made by Gen. Videla himself two months before
the coup that brought him to power at the Eleventh Congress
of American Armed Forces in Montivideo, Uruguay, in which
he reportedly said: "il faut tuer autant qu'il sera necessaire pour retablir la paix (we must kill as many.fterrorist~7
as required to bring peace back to the country)" (Poutet,

1978: 246)0

Another one came from a remark made by Alfredo

Martfnez de Hoz, the Minister of Economy, in which he said in
September 1978: "Wars are never fought with white gloves; we
have to use the same drastic methods against the terrorists
as they themselves have employed" (Amnesty International,

1980: 11).

REALITY IS
THE ONLY TRUTH
Juan Domingo Peron was strongly influenced by Italian
fascism and was profoundly nationalistic.

He was a member of

a military lodge --a society committed to: 1) the development
of an Argentine native industry requisite for a strong professional army, and; 2) to social reform as condition for national unification.
These so-called "Young Turks", proclaiming the army
to be the savior of the nation, were intent on direct rule
based upon the premise that whatever benefited the armed forces
would also benefit the country.

Consequently, the "Revolution

of 194J" transferred political power from the old landowning
and commercial bourgeoisie to a new bureaucracy headed by the
military (see eg., Villanueva, 1975; Rock, 1975; Thompson,

1978; Hodges, 1976).
Peron's major contribution to Argentina was in the
early phase of Argentine peronism in which he demonstrated
his ability as a leader to mobilize the society from a vantage
point.

Controlling strategic social and political areas,

Peron was able to shape the future of his country and to affect
its norms and values (see Hodges, 1976).
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However, economic and structural realities of the
post-war years indeed dwarfed Peron.

His political skills

were considerable, but they were subjected to the changing
forces of both the internal and external economic environment.

We can not talk about the present situation in Argentina

(1976-79) without taking into consideration the past.

Peron and the whole peronist movement left scars that were to
drastically affect the country.

What is Truth?

An Argentine intellectual, Jorge Luis Borges, remarked
some thirty years ago, Jacobo Timerman recalled, that the
Argentine is not a citizen but an individual who has no notion
whatsoever of the nation he resides in; he only sees it as a
territory filled with wealth readily to be exploited (Timerman,

1981: 16).

With direct reference to that remark, Timerman

used it to describe the prevailing ideological contradictions
in the Argentine society:
Right-wing sectors would accept fthis remart7as an
absolute truth, claiming that the flood of immigrants
was responsible for the destruction of the roots implanted by the Spanish monarchy --those Hispanic roots
of the noble Bourbons and of Franco,
Immigrants came
merely to get rich ... It was they who prevented consolidation of a notion of citizenry.
Liberal sectors fwould clai_gy that it was the
incapacity of the Argentine ruling class to understand the immigrant phenomenon --with all its contributions to creativity, culture, the republican
and democratic spirit, all its impulse toward civic
activity, the struggle for human rights and man's
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equality -- and, specifically, the battle of the
ruling aristocratic groups against unlimited immigrant access to eve.ry level of Argentine life ,.,Lp·articularlyJ political life, that have prevented national consolidation, and hence the creation of
Argentine citizenry.
Leftist sectors !would argu_gJ that a man can only
geniuenely feel that he 0 s a ctizen within a socialist
nation, and therefore no bourgeoisie nation can expect its inhabitants to share any possible common
interests.
Fascists Lwould argu.§.7 that citizens exist only
when a central power organizes them as such, and
that it is precisely that central power, which is
required to give explanation to no one, that is lacking in Argentina. (Timerman, 1981: 16-17)

As pointed out in chapter two, Peron, while in exile,
maintained formal alliance with his followers in Argentina in
the hope of using them to form a strong foundation for his
quest for political power.

His followers were composed of

two major factions: the Montoneros, consisting mainly of
urban guerilla, and; the AAA, consisting of policemen and
retired noncommissioned officers.

Coexisting with these two

were the rural and urban Trotskyite guerillas (ERP); the
peronist death-squad; the armed terrorist groups of the large
labor unions; the paramilitary army groups; the para police
force groups1 and many other minor factions.

Both the left

and the right continue to battle for supremacy within the
organizations of federal and provincial forces.
According to Timerman, Juan Peron approved of the use
of violence (Timerman, 1981: 24).

Indeed Peron would lend

support to any murder, kidnapping, or assault that helped
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him to achieve his goal "the conquest or reconquest of power"
(Timerman, 1981: 25).
"Reality is the only truth," was Peron's slogan.
It may be interpreted in many different ways.

It could mean,

for instance, "an incitement to give careful and meticulous
scrutiny to data culled from reality, in order to discover
peaceful, moderate paths toward a political solution of problems" (Timerman, 1981: 25).

However, it is taken to show

the peronist's "intolerance of any solution outside the ken
of its own totalitarian rigidity, and provided the justification for utterly irrational acts in the economic, cultural,
and political spheres; in fact, the only admissable reality
was peronism, since the peronists were in the majority ... the
onl;y truth was the peronist way of life £emphasis addei7"
(Timerman, 1981: 25).

HIGH FLYING ADORED
In 1976 Argentina was a country of unusual paradox.
The government that had previously received overwhelming public support was now rapidly losing it.
tines urged the military to intervene.

In fact many ArgenIndeed during the

peronist years saw many problems of violence, economic mismanagement, corruption, and an inability to resolve national
frustrations.
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As of 1 December, 1975, over 600 people had been
killed as result of terrorist conflict that had continued
unabated (Fernandez, 1976: 7J).
increasingly disruptive.

Economic activities became

Inflation was running over 200%

(Fernandez, 1976: 7J).
The downfall of the peronist government can be
attributed to many causes, but the most important, perhaps,
was Isabel Peron's inability to rule.

When Juan Peron was

president, the concept of verticalismo clearly applied to him.
This concept states that Peron was the unquestioned leader
of the peronist movement.

As president, he was, in effect,

the source of all real and formal power in the nation.

This

bestowed a mystical aura of functional autonomy to this leadership (see eg., Jordan, 1977 and Fernandez, 1976).

With

Peron's death, however, his widow and his constitutional successor did not inherit this authority.

Isabel Peron could

not govern nor could she practice political neutrality.
"She exacerbated the split between the right and the left-wing
sectors in the peronist movement" (Fernandez, 1976: 7J).

THE COUP
TO END ALL COUPS
From the time that the military junta assumed complete
control, it announced that its aims were to:
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assure the later restoration of a republican,
.
representative and federal democracy, in accordance
with the reality and demands for a solution, and to
achieve progress for the Argentine people fsic7.
(OAS, 1980: 248)
The Argentine government argued that in order to
achieve stated ends, "harmful elements" to the Argentine way
of life was its principal concern.

Indeed the government

continuously justifies itself in employing repressive tactics
to legally exterminate these "microbes" from the system,
Naturally, it is acceptable to most people that a
government must maintain public order and preserve the safety
of its inhabitants.

It is also acceptable that "in the life

of any nation, threats to the public order or to personal
safety of its inhabitants, by persons or groups that use violence, can reach such proportions that it becomes necessary,
temporarily, to suspend the exercise of certain human rights"

(OAS, 1980: 26).

However, it is rather difficult to concep-

tualize the use of terror as a form of regular and normal
gover~ent.

TERRORISM
AND

REPRESSIVE POLITICS
What constitutes "terrorism" is still highly controversial.

Some may feel that the validity of such action as
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resisting an oppressive totalitarian regime is indeed justifiable.

By the same token, others argue that government can

also justify itself by engaging in acts of establishment terrorism because its aims are to protect and prevent the society
from destructive elements.

Nevertheless, there are others

who feel that the use of violence in this manner, irregardless
of the motivation, is considered negative and even criminal
and must be punished in accordance with applicable law (see
discussion in Alexander, ed.,

1976: xi).

One of the most common manifestations of revolutionary
terrorism is the use of sporadic and unyielding "extra-normal"
non-governmental violence, principally, but not exclusively,
as component of a transnatio~al revolutionary strategy (see
eg,, Alexander,

1976; Buckley & Olsen, 1980; Dobson & Payne,

1979; Halperin, 1976).

Significantly enough, the strategy of

political and ideological violence in the context of domestic
and transnational revolution and warfare does not prescribe
immediate victories over established regime or state (Alexander,

1976: xiv).
On the contrary, the struggle for fundamental political, economic, and social change is seen as complicated and protracted, Terrorist groups, by their
very nature, are too small and too weak to achieve
an upper hand in an open struggle for sheer power.
Violence can therefore accomplish nothing in terms
of immediate goals.
Because of this realization,
terrorists aim at psychological rather than physical result. (Alexander, 1976: xiv)
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Hence the purpose of terrorism is to instill an
emotional state of extreme fear in specific groups and thereby
to ultimately change their behavior and dispositions, or to
bring about a general or particular change in the structure
of the society (Alexander, 1976: xiv).
Modern terrorism has also introduced a new generation of warfare in terms of technology, victimization, threat
and response (see eg., Alexander, 1976; Buckley & Olsen, 1980;
Dobson & Payne, 1979),

Opposition forces today possess highly

sophisticated and portable instruments of death and destruction (Alexander, 1976: xv).

Modern technology has also pro-

vided both sides of the terrorist spectrum with a facility
unknown in the past --intercommunication among them across national boundaries (Alexander, 1976: xv).

While revolutionary

terrorist groups are able to obtain unprecedented news coverage for their causes, the establishment terrorists are able
to abduct refugees or political prisoners from one country to
another by conspiring with that country in an act of "transnational abduction" (see Department of State, 1976, 1977, 1978,

1979, 1980).

Evidences put out by the Department of State

substantiate

the belief that it is prevalent among Argentina,

Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
The sanction of violence coupled with new opportunities given by the advances in technology has lifted the magnitude and brutality of modern terrorism to a scale far higher

62

than that of the past (Alexander, 1976: xvi).

The intended

targets of attack are not limited to individuals and property
with direct involvment in a particular struggle (Alexander,

1976: xvi).

This results, unfortunately, in the wasteful

death of innocent people.
The utilization of violence spreads like a contagious
from which no one remains immune.

Tragically being touched

are the lives of a growing number of defenseless victims who
are either kidnapped, "disappear", or killed by both forces
of terrorism (Alexander, 1976: xvi).

Indiscriminate and un-

restricted acts of violence have, indeed, turned every place
one can imagine into a battlefield in which there is no known
frontier.

CRY NOT FOR
ARGENTINA
The pattern of political change in Argentina may
well baffle many who believe that democratic government is
the culmination of political development (see Smith, 1974:
preface).

Despite the alleged socio-economic requisite as

prescribed by Lipset for democratic growth, Argentina passed
through a democratic period and then moved on to authoritarian forms of government (Smith, 1974: preface).
Although Samuel P. Huntington may argue that,
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The most important causes of military intervention in politics. are not rnili tary but political
and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the
political and institutional structure of the society
(Huntington, 1968: 194),
it is, in the view of this author, the explanations of Peter
H. Smith which are more direct to the point in the Argentine
case"

Smith focused his attention upon: first, the creation

of professional armed forces imbued officers with such militaristic and anti-democratic values that they use their power
to overthrow civilian government; second, societal demands
outstripped institutional capacity to moderate and channel
conflicts (1974: xvi).
Moreover, it is important to recognize the fact that
there has been increasing acceptance of military regimes as
"normal" political constellations and of military interventions
as "normal" and·"institutionalized" phenomena.
The coup of 24 March 1976 was intended as a coup to
end all coups.

The junta announced that its objectives was

not only the termination of the chaos of the peronist years,
but also the reconstruction of Argentine society. 1

The

1. In his book Los que Mandan, Jose Luiz de Irnaz
argued that from the pattern of military intervention, the
Argentine army has engaged in a form of incomplete intervention (1964: 45~84). It takes over and then steps out. Irnaz
believed that this behavior sterns from the high degree of
military professionalism. The military (as are most Argentines) is largely middle class. It is concerned with the
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Videla government has expressed sincerity in desiring the
return of democracy.

However, it reasoned that because of

terrorist warfare, the country must first be rid of this
menace.
When a government enjoys broad popular support from
the people, as does the Videla administration, it seems that
the method of confronting the threat of terrorism through
legal neans will always be successful.
has chosen another method.

But the government

In effect, it has chosen to under-

take acts of establishment terrorism.
And what price stability?

That the innocent of any

crime must be sacrified to achieve stated ends is acceptable
to the government that wants to return the country to democracy?
There are two fundamental principals to be recognized:
first, the rights of a government to maintain public order
and to preserve personal security of its citizen through the
rule of the law; second, the rights of the individuals to life,

1. (cont 0 d.) welfare and security of the nation.
In addition the military seems to have developed a great disdain for politicians who place partisan interests above national
honor. But by the same token, its professional values tell
it not to stay in office too long --good soldiers should not
mix with politics (Imaz, 1964: 84).

to due process, and also to personal safety.
be achieve only if the latter is observed.

The former will
The government of

Argentina, no doubt, is sincere in its objectives.

But it

must remember that the price for stability should never exceed the cost.

A CONCLUDING WORD
The main ideas that the author attempts to put forth
in this thesis are:
a) no attempts were made to strengthen the institutions' capacities to channel and moderate conflicts
b) methods employed in solving any political conflicts have been, in most instances, through the use
of the politics of repression
c) as past Argentine experience has shown (as pointed
out in chapters two and four) repression as a form of
regular government did not bringforth stability nor
did it restore civic and economic order.
Whether this impression will be clearly understood
by the readers is another mattero

The author would only like

to reiterate that it is these ideas which he wanted to express.
He hopes that he had succeeded.

:
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Argentina:

Statistical Profile

Area (sqmire :!<1T1s)
Mid-year population, 1979
Annual population growth ( 1970-78)
Percentage LL.~ban population, 1978
Percentage of literacy, 1978
P,:rcentage of tmiversity students, 1972
Infant ::ro,taJLty pffi:· 1,000, 1970
Doctors pe:::-· 1,000 :inh'.1.hLtants, 1969
Radio rcc-·ive2:s per 1,000, 1971
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1.3%
81.4%
94. G":b
1.1;,
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APPENDIX

II:

NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINE CIRCULATION
IN GH.El\TER BU.ENOS A.IRES

Table 1.

Daily Circulation of newspapers in Greater Duenos Aires
(June 1980)

420,000
280,000
270,000
220,000
110.000
19,000
3.,000
18,000

Cla.rin
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Cronica (rr:ornir1g edition)
La Nacion
La Prensa
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The Buenos Aires Herald (in English)

Source:

La-tin A,11en:CJa Heekly Report, 25 July 1980, p. 6
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POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGIITS 1
IN ARGENTINA, 1972-78

----·-·--··---······~-~-------~

Po1itical
Rights 2

Year

1972

6

197~3
19711

2

3.

44
5-,-.

6-

6- a
5+

6
6

(1

2"

3
2

2
2

1975
1976
1977
1978.

1c

Ci YJil

Rights 3

=

best score; 7

=

~urst sco~e)

This ''freedom'' sarvcy, conducted annually by Freedom Hrnme,
defines freedom in terms of lx)th civil and p<>litical :free<h'718
ao these have been traditionally understood :.n the constitutional denDcratic states.
The score for poliUcal rights is dete:rCTi.ned by the degree
to whJcl1 a given cmmtry satisfies the follo-,,·:ng requirements:
(a) tlu t J ca.ders are chosen in decisions mad 0: on the basis of
an open voting process, (b) that signlficant oppo.sttion is
allowed to cor:ipete in this procei:;s, (c) th."'tt the.re are multiple
· political part1es and ca11didates not selected by the government, ( d) that poll ing and cotmting votes is conducted without
coercion or fraud, (e) that a s1gnificant share of political
:powe.r: is exer·cj.sed by elected repx-esentatives, (f) that all
regions, even the rmst rLYrote, are included in the political
process, and (g) that the country is free o:f foreign or mi1ita:.:y control o.r influence, Countries assif.:,'Ti~>cl a rank of 1
rrnst closely satisfy thes,,, :requirements and those assigned a
rank of 7 most seriously violate them.
The sc~o-re :for civil right,; is determined by the degree of
lib0rty a give.a cou.11.try grants its news r.1edia and individual
citizens, pr.irri.arily as it applies to political e:h,j:lress.ion.
The survey look..c; at censorship applied to the press or radio.

(cont'd.)

It also assesse::; t.h~ rights grrmted ax1y indiv:id:..tal to openly
t:xp::·es~.:; ideas, to be1ong to an o:r-ganizd.lion :·ree of goV(i::-nmunt SU't)ervision, c:U1d the individ,nl's right to a :fair trial
i. o. , t hf: degn.:;e to ,vliich the j udic.iary is ir iclependent of
adr:1i,nistrative contro1. Also :irnpurtant is t1w number of: political prisoners hE!ld :in the country, the use of torture or
brutality, and the deg,TeE-! to which the state security forces
res1Jeet individual rights. Countries assigned the rank of 1
grant the greatest degree of civil liberties and those assigned
the rmik of 7 rrust seriously violate than.
a.

Cha11ge in st2.tus since the previous year owing to reevaluation
by the author. 'I'his does not jmp1y any chan.ge in the country.

Sou.::ce:

Statist1:cal Abstract; of Latin !,,merica_,

Vol. 20
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APPENDIX IV: CHRONOLOGY OF TERROR, 1968-76 l

Date

Place

Group

Incident

----------1068

October 6

Cordoba

Ibrribs da::mge off ices of US
COCJpa..11ies: :First Natioaal Bank,
Pepsi-Cola, Squibb a11d Dunlop Tires.
Start of three-d.:'l.y campaign o:f bomblng
US institutions ..

Buenos

Oberd'<Ul Sallustro, president of
ERP
Fiat of Argentina, is kidnapped. F5at
agrees to pay $1 million ransom and
reinstate 250 ·workers fired in industrial
dispute. Government refuses to release
50 prisoners, launches a hunt for tho
kidnappers' hideout, finds and &urrrnmds ·
it. Just before soldiers attack, the
tm·:·orists carry out thei!' thr~:at and
r.mrder Sa1lustro.

Unknmm

1~)72
March 21

ld:res

1973

June 6

December 6

Bs. P.s.

Bs. P._s.

Cha:rles Lockwood, a British
businessr!'.an, is kidnapped and held
for 53 days until he is ranSOi"":'ied for
$2 million. Lockwood is later
kidnapped by another group. He tells
then that it is unfair to expect a.
"second suck at the orange." ·

ERP/
splinter

group

Victo:r SaIITJPlson, Pmerica.n execu- ERP
tive of Exxon, i:::: kidnapped and ransomed for the· h1-1gc · sum of $14. 2 million.
Released on April 29, 1974.

1975
tTur1e

Bs. As.

Jorge and Juan Born, sons of

Montoneros

(Co!lt'd.)

Place

Date

Inc.iden t

Grollp

·---·-. ---·. --Jorge Born, chairr.-:!an o-f the Bu.nge y
Born comnercial empi:re, were
·
kid..;apped and ranscmed for $60 1:1:Ulion
in cash and $1.2 .r.ti.llion in food
and cl.othing distributed to the poor.
1976

June 1.8

Bs. As

General Cesareo Cardozo, chief
ERP
of Federal Police, is killed by lxmb
exploding m1der his bed. The bomb
was believed to have been placed there
by a :friend of his daughter. He is
the second chi.ef killed in 1.ess than
two yearr;.

July 19

A:rgentLr:ia

Roberto Santucho, overall leader
of the E[ll?, is killed in battle with
the author.i.ties. His death is a
severe blow to the rrDvement .

1.

This ehronology lists "those acts c< terrorisn wh:ich,
over the last 10 yea.rs, have actua:ny af fer.te<1 the coHrse
o:f. national and \'.Drld affair (Dobson and hiyrn.-1, 1979: 203)."

Som·ce:

From wbson and Payne ( 1979: 203-225)

APFE.NDIX

V:

TEHROHIST GROUPS l

ARGENTINA
Montoneros
Or;gfns: Fnrrned by left-wing supporters of Peron, it has
strong affi>,tions with the trade union movement. Disappointed '.vtth Peron's performance and that of his wi<low, who succeeded him. the Montoneros emerged in 1975
as the guerilla wing of the Authentic Peronist Party.

Ideology and aims: It was reported in February 1976
that thi,:.; group saw itself engaged in a "war of liberation" invnlving a socialist revoluti,m an<l the defeat of
the "iri1peralism" of foreign capital. Its aims in fact recall
the original ideals of Peronisrn with their glorification of
the desccunisaclos (the shirtless ones).

Activities: Has carried out assassinations, bombings and
kidnappings, and has made an attempt to seize control of
the trade unions through an underground amalgamation
of unions called the Confederation General de Trabajo en
Resistencia (the General Confederation of Workers for
Resistance). Also took part in the rural guerilla earn-·
paign with ERP and armed itself by setting up weapons
factories-with expert help from the trade unions-to
produce its own arms.
International links: None are known; the Montoneros is
essentially an Argentinian group.
Achievements: Has had considerable success in its trade
union activities, provoking strikes and engagir1g in industrial sabotage. But is under increasing pressufe from
the security forces.
Strength: At one sbge the group was estimated to have a
well-m·ganized military force of some 7,500-this has
now b~en whittled down to less than 2,000. Roberto Quieto, one of its founder-leaders, was captured in December
1975, and the lerrdership is now in the hands of l\1ario
Firmenich. It still has extensive support; in the factories
and, lil:e ERP, among radical priests, though less so
among, lte intellectuals.

Future prospects: In the latter part of 1976 and 1977 the
Montoneros became less effective due to pressure from
the military government, but through working-class support it could still pose a threat to Argentina's stability,
although this would stem more from industrial action
than L1!rrorism.

ARGENTINA
Ejercito Revo!ucionario del Pueblo (ERP)
Origins: Founded in 1969 by Roberto Santucho as the
armed branch of the Revolutionary Workers' Party. It
started operations in 1970, three years after the death of
Che Guevara, who had rejected Argentina as the most
suitable place to set up a revolutionary foco in favor of
Bolivia, a choice that was to lead to his death.

Ideology and aims: Marxist-Leninist, with a strong vein
of Trotskyism. The group is dedicated to the overthrow of
the capitalist system in Argentina and other South
American countries.
Activities: Has carried out a unique combined program of
urban terrorism and rural guerilla warfare. In the to\vns
it has concentrated on raising money through the kidnapping of foreign businessmen and diplomats, the murder of officials and of members of right-wing assassination teams, and a general assault on the stn1ctun• of society. In the countryside large forces of combined ERP
and Montoneros fighters, sometimes in battalion
strength, have taken on the army in pitched battles, The
bloodiest of these actions took place on December 22.
1975 when an estimated 500 ERP guerillas tried to storm
the barracks at Monte Chingolo, only a few mile::; south
of Buenos Aires. The garrison seems to have been forewarnec.l and was ready for the attacking party. The
fighting went on all night and in the end six civikrns,
nine soldiers, and 85 g1.v~rillas lay dead. It \Vas a d::-;vastating blow and followed a series of defeats in the guerillas' attempts to occupy a "liberated area" in the rugged
mountains and jungle of Tucuman. They lost an estimated 600 men in this campaign, including Santucho's

brother, Asdrubal. These losses forced a change in tactics. Fewer large-scale operations were mounted and
none of them involved more than 50 men and wor:1en.
The grot.1p turned increasingly to urban warfare and selective ,' :;;assination. In July 1976, however, ERP was
dealt a; ,~ow that may prove f;,tal. Roberto Santucho. his
second-; t-command, Jose Urteaga, and several other
leader:. Nere killed when the police raided their hideout
in a Btwnos Aires apartment. Since then the scale of activity has dropped dramatically.
-

1.

so-,irco:

Adapted fron Dobson &"'1d Payne (1979: 180-183).

/nt,,,·national lin{(s: The ERP cooperates with mosl of the ·
othn· Soulh Anwrican groups through an organization
called the Junta de Co-ordinacion Revolucionaria (JCR). ,
Establislrnd in 1974 to facilitate joint planning, f unqing !
and su~)port, the JCR was <lep,.,ndent financially on the :
ERP. Since the authorities in South America began to
inflict heavy casualties on the revolutionaries in the
mi<l-1970s, the JCR's ov,,:seas headquarters in Paris has
become increasingly important. Assassinations ·of South
American ambassador', in Europe have been carried out
under the auspices of :.'.,e JCR, terrorist cells hn.ve been
set up in a number of countries and links have been established with European and Palestinian groups. Other
members of the JCR are Bolivia's National Liberation
Army (ELN), Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary
Ldt (MIR), Paraguay's National Liberation Front (Frepal; .1~1) and Uruguay's Tupamaro5 (MLN).
Achievements: The ERP has become rich and has caused
the deaths of many people. But it has failed in its aim of
bringing about revolution in Argentina. It is one of the
idi:ological touchstones of terrorists that if they can succeed in pr,,voking a right-wing coup or the enforcement
of extremely repressive measures, a countermovement
will inevitably arise to destroy the government and bring
about the revolution. But in both Uru1c,iuay and Argentina exactly the opposite has happened. The right-wing
governm~,nts brought to power because of revolutionary
terrorism have crippled the terrorist movements in both
countries. ERP activities also caused the formation of
right-wing terrorist groups, notably the Alian?'.a An-

ticomunist.a Argentina, better known as the Triple A.
This organization, \vhich operated with some official support and included policemen and soldiers in its ranks,
killed anyone suspected of supporting the ERP or the
Montone,{)3. They tortured, then shot their victims and
left them lying literally in heaps around Buenos Aires.
They foug:1t a war of kill and counterkill even more ruth-.
less than t.hat fought between the Arabs and the Israelis
after M,;:1ich. However, with the decrease in the ERP's
adivitiPs and the strong line taken by the military government of General Jorge Videla, this organization, too,
has become less adive.

Strength: Despite the losses among the fighters, there is
still considerable support for the aims of the ERP, especially among intellectuals, radical priest:?. of the Roman Catholic Church and left-wing trade m,·,,nists.
Future prospects: As its strength is being whittled
away, the ERP is likely to turn more and more to classic
urb::m terrorism, operating in small units. It remains in
existence but is hard pressed and could only return to its
days of glory if there was a major political uphca val in
Ar~.;entina.
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